Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie
Lehrstuhl für Wissenschaftstheorie
- CV, Stukelj Gasper (July 2016) (52 KByte)
The empirically documented successful use of non-utility-maximizing strategies has posed a challenge to viewing classical rational choice theory as providing the right norms for human decision making. Many of these results are obtained in settings in which subjects are required to make some kind of a (probabilistic) judgement (e.g. a prediction or a likelihood comparison). Therefore, these results also question the adequacy of a variety of currently endorsed epistemic norms. Common to these results and proposed revision of the classical understanding of human rationality is the emphasis of a role the environment plays in assessing the rationality of human behaviour. Studying various models of decision- and judgement-making which explicitly incorporate environmental cues or constraints will help us develop a better understanding of what makes a decision rule ecological and what makes a rational agent adaptive. The aim is to catalogue relevant structural features, provide a conceptual framework to facilitate the introduction of environmental component in models of decision and judgement making, in turn allowing for a comparison between classical and ecological models, and draw consequences the results of the comparison may have on our understanding of human rationality and the way we justify our decisions and beliefs.