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Pfeifer, Niki

Dr. Dr. Niki Pfeifer

Senior Research Fellow

Contact

Mailing Address:
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie
und Religionswissenschaft
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
D-80539 München

Office:
Ludwigstr. 31
D-80539 München


Website: http://pfeifer.userweb.mwn.de/

Further Information

Niki Pfeifer was awarded his first PhD (with distinction) in psychology at the University of Salzburg (Austria) in 2006 and his second PhD (with distinction) in philosophy at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (The Netherlands) in 2012. He is currently a senior research fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy and project leader within the DFG Priority Program New Frameworks of Rationality. Moreover, he is lecturing at the University of Regensburg and an external member of the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science.

Niki Pfeifer's full academic CV is available here.

Research topics

Niki Pfeifer's research topics are located in the intersections of formal epistemology, probability logic, and the psychology of reasoning. Specifically, he is working on the philosophical and cognitive foundations of reasoning under uncertainty, conditionals, argumentation, and on quantification.

For more information see his website.

Publications since 2005

The full list of publications and downloadable papers are available here.

  • Pfeifer, N. & Tulkki, L. (in press). Conditionals, counterfactuals, and rational reasoning. An experimental study on basic principles. Minds and Machines.
  • Gilio, A., Over, D. E., Pfeifer, N., & Sanfilippo, G. (2017). Centering and compound conditionals under coherence. In Ferraro, M. B., Giordani, P., Vantaggi, B., Gagolewski, M., Gil, M. Á., Grzegorzewski, P. & Hryniewicz, O. (Eds.). Soft Methods for Data Science (p. 253-260). Dordrecht: Springer (Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing).
  • Pfeifer, N. (2017). Cognition and natural disasters: Stimulating an environmental historical debate. In Vaz, E., Joanaz de Melo, C., & Costa Pinto, L. M. (Eds.). Environmental History in the Making (p. 3-15). Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Sanfilippo, G. (2017). Square of opposition under coherence. In Ferraro, M. B., Giordani, P., Vantaggi, B., Gagolewski, M., Gil, M. Á., Grzegorzewski, P. & Hryniewicz, O. (Eds.). Soft Methods for Data Science (p. 407-414). Dordrecht: Springer (Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing).
  • Pfeifer, N. (2016). Experimental probabilistic pragmatics beyond Bayes' theorem. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft, 35(1), 89-96.
  • Gilio, A., Pfeifer, N. & Sanfilippo, G. (2016). Transitivity in coherence-based probability logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 14, 46-64. View author presentation video.
    Elsevier grants free open access until March 2, 2016.
  • Gilio, A., Pfeifer, N. & Sanfilippo, G. (2015). Transitive reasoning with imprecise probabilities. In Destercke, S. & Denoeux, T. (Eds.), Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2015) (p. 95-105). Dordrecht: Springer LNAI 9161 (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence).
  • Pfeifer, N. & Stöckle-Schobel, R. (2015). Uncertain conditionals and counterfactuals in (non-)causal settings. In Arienti, G., Bara, B. G. &amp Sandini G. (Eds.), Proceedings of the EuroAsianPacific Joint Conference on Cognitive Science (4th European Conference on Cognitive Science; 10th International Conference on Cognitive Science) (p. 651-656). CEUR Workshop Proceedings, Vol. 1419.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2014). Reasoning about uncertain conditionals. Studia Logica, 102(4), 849-866.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2014). Editor's note: Special issue on combining probability and logic to solve philosophical problems. Journal of Applied Logic, 12(3), 233-234.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2014). Editorial and interview with Teddy Seidenfeld. The Reasoner, 8(3), 22-24.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Douven, I. (2014). Formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning. The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(2), 199-221.
  • Grundmann, T., Beierle, C., Kern-Isberner, G. & Pfeifer, N. (2013). Wissen. In Stephan, A. & Walter, S. (Hrsg.), Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft (pp. 488-500). Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2013). The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective. Thinking & Reasoning, 19(3-4), 329-345.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2013). On argument strength. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Bayesian argumentation. The practical side of probability (pp. 185-193). Dordrecht: Synthese Library Vol. 362 (Springer).
  • Pfeifer, N. (2013). Combining probability and logic (Workshop Report). The Reasoner, 7(12), 141.
  • Pfeifer, K. & Pfeifer, N. (Eds.) (2013). Forces of nature and cultural responses. Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Pfeifer, K. (2013). Forces of nature and cultural responses: An introduction. In K. Pfeifer & N. Pfeifer (Eds.), Forces of nature and cultural responses (pp. 1-4). Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2012). Experiments on Aristotle's Thesis: Towards an experimental philosophy of conditionals. The Monist, 95(2), 223-240. The abstract of this work is published in The Review of Metaphysics, 2012, 65(4), p. 938.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2012). Naturalized formal epistemology of uncertain reasoning. Second doctoral dissertation, The Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2012). Rationality frameworks for conditionals. The Reasoner, 6(10), 158-159.
  • Fugard, A. J. B., Pfeifer, N. & Mayerhofer, B. (2011). Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: Modulating relevance in uncertain conditionals. Journal of Pragmatics, 43, 2034–2042. 
  • Fugard, A. J. B., Pfeifer, N., Mayerhofer, B. & Kleiter, G. D. (2011). How people interpret conditionals: Shifts towards the conditional event. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(3), 635-648. 
  • Pfeifer, K. & Pfeifer, N. (2011). Investigating historical severe storms in Austria (1604, 1807) and England (1638). Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Severe Storms (ECSS 2011), extended abstract 38 (1-3). Palma de Mallorca, Balearic Islands (Spain).
  • Hauer, K. & Pfeifer, N. (2011). Reporting on historical severe storms: Two examples of Utrecht (1674) and Abtenau (1796). Atmospheric Research, 100(4), 580-585.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2011). Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity. Commentary on Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting "ought" from "is": Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(5), 263-264.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2011). Editorial and interview with Wilfrid Hodges. The Reasoner, 5(11), 178-183.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2010). Uncertain deductive reasoning. In K. Manktelow, Over, D. E., and S. Elqayam (Eds.), The science of reasoning: A Festschrift for Jonathan St. BT Evans (pp. 145-166). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2010). The conditional in mental probability logic. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds.), Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thought (pp. 153-173). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2009). [Review of the book Numerical term logic]. Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation, 1(2), 133-136.
  • Fugard, A. J. B., Pfeifer, N., Mayerhofer, B. & Kleiter, G. D. (2009). How people interpret an uncertain If. In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (Eds.). Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing (pp. 80-91), Liblice, CZ.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2009). Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 7(2), 206-217.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2009). Mental probability logic. Commentary on Oaksford & Chater: Bayesian Rationality. The Probabilistic Approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(1), 98-99.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2008). A probability logical interpretation of fallacies. In G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl, & E. Hiebl (Eds.), Rhetorische Wissenschaft: Rede und Argumentation in Theorie und Praxis (pp. 225-244). Wien: LIT.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2007). Human reasoning with imprecise probabilities: Modus ponens and Denying the antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications (pp. 347-356). Prague, CZ.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2007). Rational argumentation under uncertainty. In G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (Eds.). Persuasion und Wissenschaft: Aktuelle Fragestellungen von Rhetorik und Argumentationstheorie (pp. 181-191). Wien: LIT.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2006). Inference in conditional probability logic. Kybernetika, 42, 391-404.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2006). Is human reasoning about nonmonotonic conditionals probabilistically coherent? Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing (pp. 138-150). Mikulov, CZ.
  • Pfeifer, N. (2006). On mental probability logic. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg. (Abstract published in The Knowledge Engineering Review, 2008, 23, pp. 217-226).
  • Pfeifer, N. (2006). Contemporary syllogistics: Comparative and quantitative syllogisms. In G. Kreuzbauer & G. Dorn (Eds.). Argumentation in Theorie und Praxis: Philosophie und Didaktik des Argumentierens (pp. 57-71). Wien: LIT.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter G. D. (2006). Towards a probability logic based on statistical reasoning. In Proceedings of the 11th IPMU Conference (Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems) (pp. 2308-2315). Paris, France.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2005). Inference in conditional probability logic. In Proceedings of the 8th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under Uncertainty (pp. 101-108). Trest, CZ. Revised version published 2006 in Kybernetika, 42(4), 391-404.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2005). Towards a mental probability logic. Psychologica Belgica, 45(1), 71-99.
  • Pfeifer, N. & Kleiter, G. D. (2005). Coherence and nonmonotonicity in human reasoning, Synthese, 146(1-2), 93-109.