LMU
LUDWIG-
MAXIMILIANS-
UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNCHEN

MUNICH CENTER FOR MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY - MCMP

LMU · Ludwigstr. 31/II · 80539 München

Lehrstuhl

Prof. Dr.
J. Nida-Rümelin
Frau Zuber

HP

PROF. DR. DR. HANNES LEITGEB

Telefon +49 (0)89 2180-6171
Telefax +49 (0)89 2180-xxxx

Office.leitgeb@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Postanschrift
Ludwigstraße 31/II Raum 226
80539 München

Ihr Zeichen, Ihre Nachricht vom

Unser Zeichen
Pö/11

München, 31.08.2011

Workshop in Mathematical Philosophy

im Rahmen des Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie

Senatssaal der LMU
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1

13. September und 14. September 2011

Als Veranstalter des Workshops fungiert das *Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy* der LMU München. Der Workshop beschäftigt sich mit Anwendungen logischer und mathematischer Methoden in verschiedenen Bereichen der Philosophie. Die Workshop-Sprache wird Englisch sein.

Hier das vorläufige Programm des Workshops:

September 13th:

14:15 - 14.30: Hannes Leitgeb (LMU München): Introduction.

14:30 - 15:45: Volker Halbach (Oxford)

Title: **Self-reference**

Abstract: What does it mean for a sentence to say about itself that it is P? Here P can stand for any unary sentential function such as 'is provable', 'is not provable', 'is true', or 'is a sentence'. I will study this question in a metamathematical setting. After reviewing some early attempts to tackle the question and their impact on problems in metamathematics such as Henkin's problem, I will put forward a new proposal and test its adequacy with some examples.

15:45 - 16:00: Coffee.

16:00 - 17:15: Branden Fitelson (Rutgers)

Title: **An "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.**

Abstract: In this talk, I will raise a potential problem for Joyce's argument for probabilism (and sufficiently similar "accuracy-dominance"-based arguments for probabilism). The problem involves a potential conflict between "accuracy-dominance" (coherence) norms and certain "evidential" norms for credences. An interesting analogy with the case of full belief is also drawn (which connects up with a larger project on the relationship between accuracy, coherence, and evidential norms for various sorts of judgments). This is joint work with Kenny Easwaran.

17:15 - 18:30: Group Presentation, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU).

September 14th:

14:15 - 15:30: Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg)

Title: **Voting, Deliberation and Truth**

Abstract: There are various ways to reach a group decision. One way is to simply vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses -- a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy (as everybody endorses the consensus), it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. What is more, a deliberation is easy to bias as those group members who make others change their mind may not necessarily be the best truth-trackers. But even if no such biases are present, the consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: When is deliberation a better method to track the truth than simple majority voting? To address this question, we propose a Bayesian model of rational non-strategic deliberation and compare it to the straight forward voting procedure. The talk is based on joint work with Soroush Rafiee Rad.

15:30 - 16:00: Coffee.

16:00 - 17:15: Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen/Columbia).

Title: **IPAD – Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy**

Abstract: Only one species have configured a democracy and decided to live according to deliberative democratic guidelines. The configuration and decision is particular to man. A deliberative democracy is characterized by both group deliberation, decision and action. Central to this epistemic composite is information as information processing is an essential fabric of rational deliberation, decision and action which in turn amount to the rational interaction among members of a group or a democracy. Thus, a robust deliberative democracy is the quintessential example of rational agent interaction. This intimate connection fuels a new research paradigm in interdisciplinary philosophy: IPAD -- Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy.

17:15 - 18:30: Group Presentation, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU).