Zoom Talk: Bruno Jacinto (Lisbon)
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Information, Credences and Epistemic Norms
According to the information-theoretic account of belief and knowledge (Stampe 1979, Dretske 1981, Stalnaker 1984, Millikan 1989), the content of these attitudes is determined by the extent to which an agent's belief states carry information about her environment. In this talk I will propose a natural extension of the information-theoretic account. This extension supplements the account with theory of credal content and epistemic normativity that is naturally suggested by the account. In addition, I will show some of the predictions of this extension with respect to the status of some epistemic norms, specifically of the truth norm of belief, the knowledge norm of belief, the enkratic principle and rational reflection. Along the way I will flag some aspects in which the account is presumably idealized and suggest ways of making it more realistic.