Talk: Alex Moran (Oxford)
Panpsychism and the alleged problem of intrinsic natures
It is argued by panpsychists that current physics does not reveal the intrinsic nature of matter, but only how it is intrinsically. In short, it tells us only what matter does, not what it is. The panpsychist then claims that consciousness might be posited as the intrinsic nature of matter and that this might help us to solve the so-called hard problem of consciousness: of accounting for subjective, qualitative experience within the seemingly purely quantitative world physics describes. Here I set out a new critique for this programme, borne partly of a scepticism regarding the problem of intrinsic natures, and partly from my belief that in fact there is a broader problem here - which panpsychism does nothing to address. This is the problem of the manifest - to which, interestingly enough, Russellian neutral monism may be a better answer.