Talk (Work in Progress): Ilho Park (Jeonbuk)

Title:

Accuracy, Evidence, and Conditionalization

Abstract:

It is often taken for granted that evidence, though not necessary, epistemically improves our credal state. The so-called accuracy-firster may regard this thought as a bridge connecting between evidence and accuracy. In this regard, Fallis and Lewis (2016 and 2021) formulate the Monotonicity Principle, which is intimately related to such a thought, and show that only a few accuracy measures satisfy the principle. Moreover, they argue, with the help of this result, that accuracy-firsters cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism. In this talk, however, I will argue that their claims are a bit hasty. In particular, I will show that, when a suitable way of representing the impact of evidence on our credal state is given, some accuracy measures satisfy the Monotonicity Principle, and so that we can arrive at a different conclusion from Fallis and Lewis’s claims.