Talk: Carrie Figdor (Edinburgh)

Title:

A Defense of Substrate-Dependence in the Sciences of the Mind

Abstract:

I argue against the principle of substrate (or medium) independence (PSI) associated with functionalist individuation of mental types. This principle holds that the individuation conditions of types of mental states impose no logical restrictions on the nature of the physical types that can realize (or implement) the roles: for example, episodic memory is a type of mental state defined in terms of its role in a cognitive system, and this type can be multiply realized in humans, computers, octopuses, or any other type of physical system. While PSI was a boon to the growth of cognitive science and is central to the dominant functionalist consensus in philosophy of mind, it has become a major conceptual impediment to the development of our best explanations of cognition and consciousness in biological organisms, and in consequence to our efforts to theorize the possibility of artificial consciousness and cognition in a way guided by scientific knowledge.