Research Seminar in Decision and Action Theory: Richard Holton (Cambridge) (joint work with Elijah Herenstein)

Title:

Intentions and Intentionality: Both Prime (by Richard Holton and Elijah Herenstein)

Abstract:

Various authors have proposed taking the notion of intentional action as prime. Often (for instance in the work of Williamson and Levy) this has involved using the notion to provide an account of intentions and of intending. We are sympathetic to the first project, but suspicious of the second. After saying why we think Williamson and Levy’s accounts do not work, we question the long-standing assumption (dating at least to Anscombe) that we should expect a tight connection between the concepts expressed by (i) the verb ‘to intend’ and the noun ‘intention’, and, (ii) the adjective ‘intentional’ and the abverb ‘intentionally’. Etymology and usage patterns suggest no close connection. Other English terms in the vicinity (‘mean’; ‘plan’, ‘on purpose’ etc.) do not bridge such a wide range; and nor do the terms in many other languages. We propose that the two groups express separate prime notions, with fairly weak connections between them. We provide the outline of accounts for each, broadly following Bratman for the first, and developing a different idea of Anscombe’s for the second.

The seminar will be held in person, but here is a Zoom link for remote participation:
https://lmu-munich.zoom.us/j/93279453658?pwd=MGRkZ1lOYTVtK2tleWVHbFZ4UFNzZz09