Research Seminar in Decision and Action Theory: Alessandra Marra (LMU/MCMP)

Title:

Objective Oughts and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

Abstract:

According to objectivists about ought, what we ought to do is grounded in facts. According to defenders of metaphysical indeterminacy, there are cases in which no determinate facts exist. Assume that there are such cases of metaphysical indeterminacy. Then an objectivist about ought needs an account of what we objectively ought to do when no determinate facts obtain. In this talk, I pursue two aims in relation to this ‘problem from metaphysical indeterminacy’, one positive, one negative. The positive aim will be to present, on behalf of the objectivist, two suggestions as to how to solve this problem. The first suggestion seeks to reconcile the objective ought with metaphysical determinacy by utilising the so-called ‘thin red line’ account known from the debate about the semantics of future contingents. The second proposes to provide a probabilistic interpretation of the objective ought by suggesting that, in cases of metaphysical indeterminacy, what we objectively ought to do is not grounded in an action’s actual value but its objectively expected value. My negative aim will be to show why, despite first appearances to the contrary, both suggestions ultimately remain unconvincing.

This is a joint work with Christine Tiefensee (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management).