Research Seminar in Decision and Action Theory: William Nolan (LMU)

Title:

The Need for a New Causalism in Action Theory

Abstract:

This paper proposes that both so-called ‘causalism’ and ‘non-causalism’ in action theory, by depending on a flawed theory of causation, exhibit serious deficiencies. Since Davidson’s classic 1963 essay, causalism has been the dominant orthodoxy. The view, with many variants, holds, firstly, that an agent’s primary reason rationalizes his action, and secondly, that the primary reason is also the action’s cause. This view offered a counter-position to the teleological non-causalism influential at the time, especially due to Anscombe’s Intention(1957). Non-causalism is thus subject to the critiques of ‘Davidson’s challenge’ as well as unjustifiably zero-summing teleological and causal explanations. Yet, Davidsonian causalism is similarly embattled by well-known critiques like the deviancy of causal chains and disappearing agency (Velleman 1992). Both sides, however, inherit and embrace a neo-Humean event-pair notion of causation. I argue that the challenges to each view can be overcome by abandoning neo-Humean causation and instead integrating a view of causation that understands causal relata as powers of the agent. The talk concludes with a list of desiderata for such a new causalism, such as synchrony between the causal relata and admittance of both teleological and causal elements.

The seminar will take place from 10 to 12 s.t. (please note the start at 10:00) in the MCMP’s larger seminarroom (Ludwigstr. 31 / 021).

As usual, the seminar will be held in person, but here is a Zoom link for remote participation:
https://lmu-munich.zoom.us/j/93279453658?pwd=MGRkZ1lOYTVtK2tleWVHbFZ4UFNzZz09