Research Seminar in Decision and Action Theory: Daniel Stoljar (Australian National University)

Title:

In What Sense is Consciousness First Personal?

Abstract:

The idea that consciousness is first personal, or has a first personal character, is so familiar we barely notice it. This paper reviews four main ways of spelling out the idea, before suggesting that, in its most plausible version, it is the claim that consciousness is necessarily connected to first-personal beliefs, at least in rational agents who meet further conditions. The paper also discusses the relation of this proposal to some recent work on consciousness and the first person, particularly that of Christian List.

In addition to the Wednesday seminar, we will be holding a second, more informal discussion session with Daniel Stoljar on the topic of physicalism on Tuesday 8 July at 14:15. Would anyone else who would like to participate in this additional session please send me an email? (I will then send you room details for the Tuesday session.)